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Just in time for the millennium,
President Clinton signed into law
the Federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act
(“ESIGN”), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
7001 et seq. ESIGN’s proponents
claimed it would sweep away the
barriers to electronic transactions,
and lead to widespread adoption of
electronic signatures. Perhaps the
biggest story regarding electronic
signatures coming out of the United
States right now is what has not
happened as a result of ESIGN.
ESIGN has not lead to the expected
surge in the use of digital
signatures, or the mass conversion
of paper files to electronic files, as
those millennial proponents
predicted. Rather such moves have
been slow, sporadic, and quite
often, stuck. Two competing stories
may give some insight as to why.
As a first example, consider health care records.
The Health Insurance Portability and Access Act
(“HIPAA”) proposed that digital signatures would
become a standard part of health care records (63
Fed. Reg. 4326869 (Aug.12, 1998)). Enactment of
ESIGN was expected to cement that result.
However, due to confusion over implementation
and a fear of fixed standards, the final HIPAA
security rule omitted any electronic signature
requirement (45 C.F.R. 164.312). Confusion
regarding exactly what should be required for such
signatures, despite the passage of ESIGN, has
delayed implementation of an electronic signature
standard for the purposes of health care records.
Instead, the new HIPAA rules (45 C.F.R.164.312
- Technical Safeguards) require health care
providers only to implement:
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n Technical policies and procedures (including encryption, decryption and automatic 
logoff) for access control on systems that maintain health care records.  These 
systems must allow for unique user identification and include an emergency access 
procedure for obtaining necessary health care records during an emergency 
(however, that unique user identification does not need to be a digital signature).
n Transmission security, including: Integrity controls to ensure that electronically 
transmitted health care records are not improperly modified without detection, and 
encryption, if and when necessary. Covered entities now must determine how to 
protect health care records “in a manner commensurate with the associated risk”; 
Policies and procedures to protect health care records from improper alteration or 
destruction to ensure data integrity and person or entity authentication, although 
again, digital signatures are not specifically required.
Thus, despite two federal acts (HIPAA and
ESIGN) meant to encourage adoption of digital
signatures as a standard operating practice when
dealing with electronic health care records, little
progress toward that goal has actually been made.
On the other hand, ESIGN explicitly exempted
“court orders or notices, or official court
documents (including briefs, pleadings, and other
writings) required to be executed in connection
with court proceedings.” (15 U.S.C. § 7003(b)(1)).
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court had
already amended the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1996 to allow local courts to
experiment with electronic filing (Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(e)).
In June 2003, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington became one of
the first district courts to begin that experiment.1
Practitioners in the Western District of Washington
may sign up to receive a court-issued password,
which, along with their user login, serves as their
signature for all purposes under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Generally, documents are
submitted in Adobe Acrobat .pdf format. The court
has issued detailed procedures to cover such issues
as service, multiple signatures, confidential records,
and the effect of technical failure, which
procedures are available on its web site.
Similarly, the King County Superior Court (which
encompasses Seattle and neighbouring cities within
its jurisdiction), is moving aggressively to allow for
A r t i c l e
electronic filing of documents, including use of
electronic signatures by judges, attorneys, and
litigants to authenticate and verify filings. The
State Supreme Court greased the wheels for such
an experiment by enacting General Rule 30 on
September 1, 2003.2 General Rule 30 allows for,
but does not require, electronic filing. However, it
does mandate that “an electronic document has
the same legal effect as a paper document” (GR
30.3). For purposes of authentication, GR 30.5 lays
out the following guidelines:
a) the person must first receive a court-
approved password and personal 
identification number,
b) that password and PIN must be used in 
conjunction with any electronic filing to 
create a presumption that the person who 
owns the password and PIN actually signed 
the document,
c) declarations and affidavits may also be so 
electronically signed, and
d) the electronic signature shall have the same 
effect as an ordinary signature.
The King County Clerk’s Office is now working
towards implementing the technology to allow
King County to be the first trial court in the state
(and one of the first state courts in the nation) fully
to accept electronic filing. The King County
Superior Court has also been working closely with
the National Center for State Courts to make its
implementation a national model for courts across
the United States. Part of this model will include
allowing judges to have their own electronic
signatures to sign electronic orders. Although the
state’s funding crisis has slowed down
implementation, Barbara Miner of the King County
Superior Court Clerk’s Office expects that
implementation of electronic filing for the court
will nonetheless be completed by this year.3
Two federal court cases are also of interest
regarding the use of electronic signatures in
commerce. One deals obliquely with the
admissibility of electronic documents and the
significance to be given to a standardized
electronic signature on an e-mail.4 The second
deals with the novel concept of service of original
process by e-mail - an issue that is likely to arise
more often in the arena of electronic commerce
with the advent of virtual ecompanies.5
In the Sealand case, Sealand sued Lozen for
money owed under a shipping contract, and Lozen
counterclaimed for breach of contract and for
cargo loss and damage allegedly resulting from
Sealand’s failure to timely deliver the shipment at
issue. After the parties settled Sealand’s claims, the
district court dismissed Lozen’s counterclaims on
Sealand’s motion for summary judgment, and
Lozen appealed. The case involves some interesting
discussion of electronic bills of lading in
conjunction with paper bills of lading, which is not
particularly germane to the subject matter of this
journal. Of interest, however, was the court’s
discussion of the evidentiary effect of an electronic
signature line on an e-mail. The evidentiary issue
involved whether an internal Sealand e-mail, which
was forwarded by another Sealand employee to
Lozen, constituted the statement of a party-
opponent, such that it would not be hearsay
under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).  As
hearsay cannot be used as evidence, proving that a
statement is the statement of a party-opponent is
vital for admissibility purposes. The trial court
excluded the evidence on the ground that the
internal e-mail did not present evidence itself as
indicating the identity or job title of the employee
who wrote it (presumably because, when it was
forwarded by the second employee, the original e-
mail signature was cut off, although the opinion
fails to explain this). The appellate court reversed
the court of first instance, 285 F.3d at 821:
Exhibit 4 [the e-mail at issue] is an admission by
a party-opponent. The original e-mail, an
internal company memorandum, closes with an
electronic “signature” attesting that the
message was authored by “Mike Jacques,”
Sealand’s “Rail Reefer Services Coordinator” at
the time the e-mail was written. The original e-
mail also appears to concern a matter within
the scope of Jacques’ employment.
The court found that, when the second
employee forwarded that e-mail to Lozen, she
essentially adopted the statements of the first
employee, thus making the entire email stream an
admission of a party-opponent, and admissible for
any purpose. Essentially, the signature line acted to
selfauthenticate the e-mail for purposes of
admissibility.
The case of Rio Properties may be one of the
first cases in which original service of a summons
and complaint was allowed to be accomplished via
an e-mail. There, the plaintiff Rio Properties
brought a trademark infringement suit against a
Costa Rican entity whose only mailing address
turned out to be a courier service (which was not









identity or job title
of the employee
who wrote it 
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authorized to accept service of process) and whose only other address was an e-mail account listed on its
website. Thus, there was literally no physical address at which the defendant could be served. American due
process principles require that a defendant receive personal service in order for the court to assert
jurisdiction. However, with respect to foreign business entities, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(f)(3)
permits service “by .. means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court.”
Relying on Rule 4(f), Rio sought and obtained an order allowing it to serve a copy of the summons and
complaint - which begins the lawsuit and invokes the court’s jurisdiction - via e-mail to the defendant’s e-mail
address, which was e-mail@betrio.com. Although the defendant appeared in the lawsuit, it ultimately had a
default judgment entered against it as a result of numerous violations of court orders. On appeal, it claimed
the court had no jurisdiction, as it was never properly served. The appellate court acknowledged, 284 F.3d at
101:
[T]hat we tread upon untrodden ground. The parties cite no authority condoning service of process over
the Internet or via e-mail, and our own investigation has unearthed no decisions by the United States
Courts of Appeals dealing with service of process by e-mail and only one case anywhere in the federal
courts. Despite this dearth of authority, however, we do not labor long in reaching our decision.
Considering the facts presented by this case, we conclude not only that service by e-mail was proper - that
is, reasonably calculated to apprise RII of the pendency of the action and afford it an opportunity to
respond - but in this case, it was the method of service most likely to reach RII.
The court was particularly persuaded by the evidence that the defendant seemed to have structured its
business dealings such that it could only be contacted via its e-mail address. Nonetheless, the court also
issued a warning that such e-mail service is to be the exception, not the rule, and pointed out some of the
problems inherent in such service, in which electronic signatures (or the lack thereof) loomed large, 284 F.3d
at 1019:
Despite our endorsement of service of process by e-mail in this case, we are cognizant of its limitations. In
most instances, there is no way to confirm receipt of an e-mail message. Limited use of electronic
signatures could present problems in complying with the verification requirements of Rule 4(a) and Rule
11, both of which require an attorney’s signature on original pleadings, and system compatibility problems
may lead to controversies over whether an exhibit or attachment was actually received. Accordingly, we
leave it to the discretion of the district court to balance limitations of e-mail service against its benefits in
any particular case.
Having found that service was properly effected, the court quickly disposed of the defendant’s
jurisdictional and other substantive issues.
As discussed above, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington believes it has
adequately addressed the Ninth Circuit’s concerns regarding the verification requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Nonetheless, it is ironic that the courts, which were explicitly exempted from ESIGN,
have moved further towards the goal of purely paperless transactions than many of the industries that
originally clamored for ESIGN’s enactment. Once again, the law of unintended consequences prevails. n
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